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Using microdata from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers, this paper examines the 
relationship between marriage and wealth with particular focus on women. By exploiting 
unique data on personal wealth, it also assesses whether the wealth effect of marriage 
differs depending on whether we measure wealth in terms of personal wealth or household 
wealth, an issue that very few studies have examined thus far. When wealth is measured 
in terms of equivalized household net worth on the assumption that household resources 
are shared equally within married couples, marriage is found to contribute to women’s 
wealth holdings but only to their nonfinancial net worth, although there are some signs 
that it also contributes to their total net worth as the duration of marriage becomes longer. 
By contrast, when wealth is measured in terms of personal net worth based on the actual 
ownership of assets, marriage is found to be negatively and significantly associated with 
women’s wealth holdings. These findings underscore the fact that women in Japan are 
potentially in a financially vulnerable position even after they marry, which is driven, at 
least partly, by the fact that married women’s careers tend to be disrupted by family 
responsibilities in Japan.  
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Family structure has been undergoing significant changes in many, if not all, developed 
countries. Fewer and fewer people marry today than in the past. At the same time, there 
has been an increase in the average age at first marriage as well as in the divorce rate. 
Such trends raise the important question of how singles fare in terms of wealth 
accumulation in comparison to their married counterparts. Wealth is an important measure 
of wellbeing as it provides resources to maintain living standards in times of economic 
hardship, and it is also important as a source of funds for living expenses during old age 
and for intergenerational transfers. There is thus a growing literature that examines the 
relationship between marriage and wealth and previous studies generally find a positive 
effect of marriage on wealth (e.g., Frech, Painter, and Vespa, 2017; Painter, Frech, and 
Williams, 2015; Ruel and Hauser, 2013; Ulker, 2009; Vespa and Painter, 2011). 
 
However, there are a number of important gaps in the literature. First, previous studies 
typically use household wealth as their main outcome variable due largely to the 
unavailability of data on personal wealth. If a couple shares household resources equally, 
as commonly assumed, there should be no problem with using household wealth to 
analyze the wealth effect of marriage. On the other hand, given that an individual’s 
contribution to household wealth is likely to affect his/her access to household wealth, it 
is possible that wives, who tend to earn less than their husbands, have less access to it. 
Moreover, even if spouses fully share each other’s wealth regardless of the actual 
ownership of wealth, relying on one’s spouse to informally share his/her personal wealth 
may create undesired economic dependency within the couple (Lersch, 2017). 
 
Second, previous studies predominantly examine the instantaneous effect of marriage on 
wealth. While there are some studies that look at the effect of the duration of marriage on 
wealth, the estimation strategy in such studies assumes a linear relationship between 
marriage and wealth (e.g., Frech, Painter, and Vespa, 2017; Ulker, 2009; Zagorsky, 2005). 
However, married couples are likely to experience important changes through their 
married lives, as a result of which the wealth effect of marriage may change over time.  
 
Third, previous studies are conducted using mostly data on Australia, Europe, and the 
United States (US). To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no previous studies 
that examine the relationship between marriage and wealth in Japan. It is not clear a priori 
whether the findings of previous studies obtained for Western societies apply to other 
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parts of the world such as Asia where gender roles within households are more clearly 
delineated than in Western societies. 
 
The main aim of this paper is to fill the aforementioned gaps in the literature. Using 
microdata from the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC), it aims to examine the 
relationship between marriage and wealth in the case of Japan. It focuses its analysis on 
the case of women given long-standing concern regarding their financial security as they 
age, particularly in the case of those who remain single or those who experience such 
disruptions as marital breakdowns and widowhood. 
 
The key research questions that this paper tries to answer are threefold. First, by 
exploiting the availability of data on personal wealth, it tries to assess how marriage is 
associated with women’s wealth accumulation capacity and whether this association 
differs depending on whether we measure wealth in terms of household or personal wealth, 
an issue that very few studies have examined thus far. Second, this paper tries to go 
beyond the existing literature by examining how the relationship between marriage and 
wealth evolves over the course of the marriage and whether this over-time relationship 
differs between household and personal wealth and between financial and nonfinancial 
wealth. Third, by examining the case of Japan, the paper tries to assess whether marriage 
wealth premiums observed in Western societies are also observed in Japan. 
 
While the JPSC provides unique data on personal wealth, the data are not without 
limitations. Most importantly, in cases where nonfinancial wealth is owned jointly by 
family members, the data do not tell us each family member’s exact ownership share, 
although they tell us which family member has joint ownership of the asset. This certainly 
poses a nontrivial constraint on the analysis and the results need to be interpreted with 
caution. Nevertheless, the data still provide a unique opportunity to open the black box 
of how wealth is shared within married couples and to examine how marriage is 
associated with women’s wealth accumulation capacity.  
 
2. Institutional Context 
 
Japan has a unique institutional context, which makes it difficult to share household 
wealth within married couples, at least in legal terms. Japan adopts a separation of 
property regime. Partly as a result, joint bank accounts are virtually non-existent and 
saving is held individually even among married couples. However, if the couple has a 
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bank account in one of the spouses’ names, the other spouse can apply for an additional 
bank card (a “family card”) to access this account. Wealth transfers between spouses are 
subject to gift taxes although there is an annual exemption of 1.1 million yen (about 
US$10,000).2 Transfers for financing expenses such as living expenses and children’s 
education are also exempted from gift taxes. 
 
It is interesting to note that while wealth transfers between spouses are subject to gift 
taxes, the wealth accumulated during marriage is treated as joint assets upon divorce or 
the death of one of the spouses. In the case of divorce, a spouse can therefore claim part 
of the wealth accumulated during marriage even if it is in the other spouse’s name, except 
for wealth acquired through intergenerational transfers, which will remain in the hands of 
the recipient. 
 
In the case of the death of one of the spouses, according to Japan’s Civil Code, the 
surviving spouse’s statutory share is half of the estate of the deceased and the other half 
is divided among the children. Nevertheless, if the surviving spouse inherits the residence, 
most or all of the financial assets could go to the children because housing typically 
comprises a large share of household wealth in Japan. The financial hardship a widow 
could face upon the death of her husband has long been an issue in Japan given that the 
residence (and the land) is usually in the husband’s name and wives tend to outlive their 
husbands. As a result, even though the wife may be able to continue living in the residence 
by inheriting it, she may find herself in a situation in which she does not have enough 
financial assets to finance her living expenses. 
 
To better protect surviving spouses, the inheritance chapter of Japan’s Civil Code was 
amended in July 2018. Among other things, the amendment created the right for the 
surviving spouse to continue living in the residence that was owned by the deceased 
spouse. The right of long-term residency allows the surviving spouse to continue living 
in the residence for life or for a specified lengthy period of time even if the ownership of 
the residence is transferred to another heir. Since the value of the right of residency will 
be set lower than the appraised value of the property, the surviving spouse will be able to 
obtain more financial assets if he/she obtains the right of residency and the child inherits 
the property than if he/she inherited the property in order to continue living there. 
 
 
2 Based on an exchange rate of US$1 = 110 Japanese yen. This exchange rate is used for all conversions 
throughout the paper. 
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Furthermore, there is a special provision for a gift tax exemption of an amount of up to 
20 million yen (about US$182,000) when a residential property or money for acquiring a 
residential property is transferred between spouses. However, only couples who have 
been married for 20 years or more are eligible for this exemption and a given couple can 
use this exemption only once in a lifetime. In other words, if a young couple that has been 
married for less than 20 years decides to purchase a residential property and the wife does 
not have sufficient saving to pay for her share or does not have sufficient income to obtain 
a loan for her share, purchasing the property jointly with her husband will require the 
payment of gift taxes as the tax office will assume that the husband transferred part of his 
wealth to his wife to enable her to purchase the property jointly with him. This is likely 
to prevent married couples from having joint ownership of their residence in cases in 
which the wife does not have her own income or sufficient wealth. 
 
Other aspects of Japanese society also make Japan an interesting case to study. Japan has 
been seeing a significant increase in the share of people who never marry over the last 
few decades. The share of people who had never been married by the age of 50, which is 
sometimes regarded in Japan as the share of people who never marry in their lifetime, 
increased from 5.6% and 4.3% in 1990 to 23.4% and 14.1% in 2015 for men and women, 
respectively.3 Moreover, a large share of unmarried people reside with their parents. 
According to the 15th Japanese National Fertility Survey conducted in 2015, 4  the 
proportion of never married men and women aged 18-34 who reside with their parents 
was 72.2% and 78.2%, respectively. 
 
The relatively high prevalence of premarital coresidence with parents in Japan reflects 
limited alternative living arrangements due, at least partly, to such factors as the high cost 
of housing and normative disapproval of independent living (Raymo and Ono, 2007). 
Unmarried adult children who live with their parents in order to enjoy the comforts of life 
are sometimes called “parasite singles” (Yamada, 1999). However, recent studies show 
that the benefits of being a “parasite single” are enjoyed mainly by relatively young adult 
children and that, once their parents retire, they may face the need to support their elderly 
parents and provide elderly care instead (e.g., Okaze, 2014; Takada, 2005). In addition, 
because of the increased share of irregular employment,5 particularly among women, 
 
3  These shares are obtained from Population Statistics 2020 (available at 
http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/Popular/Popular2020.asp?chap=0). 
4 Available at http://www.ipss.go.jp/ps-doukou/j/doukou15/doukou15_gaiyo.asp 
5 Irregular employees include those who work as a part-time worker, temporary worker, fixed-term worker, 
or dispatched worker from a temporary agency. 
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over the last few decades, some adult children choose to reside with their parents out of 
necessity rather than to enjoy a high level of disposable income (e.g., Kitamura and 
Sakamoto, 2007; Shikata, 2018). Given these trends, Takagi and Silverstein (2006) argue 
that the composition of multigenerational households of the elderly in Japan is shifting 
toward a type where the instrumental concerns of both generations take precedence over 
traditional norms. 
 
The availability of information on personal wealth in the JPSC makes it possible to 
include in the estimation sample respondents who reside with their parents without 
conflating their wealth with that of their parents. This also allows us to assess whether 
living with parents helps adult children accumulate wealth. 
 
3. Literature Review 
 
3.1 Marriage and Wealth 
 
Marriage has generally been found to help accumulate wealth (e.g., Frech, Painter, and 
Vespa, 2017; Painter, Frech, and Williams, 2015; Ruel and Hauser, 2013; Ulker, 2009; 
Vespa and Painter, 2011). If we note that wealth accumulation is a function of income, 
saving, investment strategy, and intergenerational transfers, there are a number of possible 
reasons why the level of wealth holdings is expected to be greater for married couples 
than that for unmarried women. Marriage may serve as a wealth-enhancing institution by 
altering total household production and consumption patterns. Efficiency gains from the 
division of labor could increase the total output of married couples relative to the 
aggregation of outputs produced separately by each partner (Becker, 1981). Moreover, 
married couples may benefit from economies of scale in consumption, which may 
translate into additional wealth. These advantages associated with marriage are likely to 
allow married couples to accumulate wealth at a faster rate than they would as two single 
persons. Note that even with the same saving rate, given that men generally have higher 
earnings than women and that there is the possibility of dual income, married couples 
may accumulate more wealth over time than unmarried women for these reasons as well. 
 
Wealth may also be enhanced through investment, which is determined by such factors 
as the level of financial literacy and/or risk preferences. Given that men are generally 
found to have a higher level of financial literacy than women (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008) 
and that women tend to be more risk averse than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), married 
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couples may allocate their wealth in a way that yields a higher return on their assets than 
unmarried women (Bertocchi, Brunetti, and Torricelli, 2011; Christiansen, Joensen, and 
Rangvid, 2015). Married women may also benefit from the financial knowledge of their 
husbands as well as from the financial security and resource pooling associated with 
marriage. In addition, since marriage usually implies a long-term commitment, such a 
commitment may help married couples purchase a house (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2011; 
Hendershott et al., 2009), which is found to contribute to greater wealth accumulation (Di, 
Belsky, and Liu, 2007; Turner and Luea, 2009).  
 
As for the receipt of intergenerational transfers, the amount of such transfers may be 
greater for married couples than for unmarried women inasmuch as they could in principle 
receive transfers from either spouse’s parents. In the case of Japan, sons, particularly those 
who carry on the family line, are more likely to receive a bequest than daughters 
(Hamaaki, Hori, and Murata, 2019). Moreover, Hao (1996) finds that marriage reinforces 
the wealth enhancing effect of private financial transfers. 
 
While there is a growing literature that examines the relationship between marriage and 
wealth, one of the limitations of previous studies is that most studies are conducted using 
data on Western societies. By analyzing the case of Japan, this paper tries to assess 
whether marriage wealth premiums observed in Western societies are also observed in 
other parts of the world. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there are no previous 
studies that examine the relationship between marriage and wealth in Japan even though 
Japan has been observing an increase in the number of unmarried people, as a result of 
which there is growing concern about whether singles are accumulating sufficient wealth 
for old age.  
 
3.2 Distribution of Wealth within Married Couples 
 
The previous literature is also limited in another important way. It predominantly uses 
household wealth as the main outcome variable due largely to the unavailability of data 
on personal wealth. This is because, unlike information on income, information on wealth 
is usually collected at the household level in household surveys. The use of household 
wealth for examining the wealth effect of marriage essentially assumes the equal sharing 
of household wealth within married couples. Hence, if a couple shares household 
resources equally, as commonly assumed, there should be no problem with using 
household wealth to analyze the wealth effect of marriage. However, if this assumption 
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does not hold, it may be more appropriate to use personal wealth, which takes into account 
the actual ownership of wealth. In other words, whether the effect of marriage on personal 
wealth diverges from that on household wealth is likely to depend largely on how 
household resources are distributed within married couples. 
 
As far as the theoretical work on intrahousehold resource allocation is concerned, there 
are mainly two different models, namely the unitary and collective models. The difference 
between these models stems from the structure of decision-making within the household. 
The former assumes that the couple acts as a unitary unit in which the two spouses pool 
their incomes and maximize a single common utility function (Becker, 1981). 
Alternatively, the collective model assumes that the couple acts as a collective unit in 
which each spouse has different preferences and the observed household consumption, 
saving, and investment patterns are the result of bargaining within the couple (Chiappori, 
1988).6 If the couple does not pool its resources, as assumed in the collective model, each 
spouse is likely to have different wealth functions. In other words, if a unitary model 
holds, it should not matter whether household or personal wealth is used for the analysis. 
However, if a collective model holds, it is more appropriate to use personal wealth instead.  
 
Empirical evidence from previous research on intrahousehold resource allocation tends 
to support the collective model.7 Evidence from relevant studies that look at gender 
wealth gaps using personal wealth also challenges the assumption of the equal sharing of 
household resources within married couples. Grabka, Marcus, and Sierminska (2015) and 
Lee and Pocock (2007) are particularly relevant as they look at wealth gaps within 
married couples in Germany and South Korea, respectively. Both studies find that wives 
tend to hold less wealth in their own name than their husbands and that the wealth gap 
within couples depends on the balance of bargaining power between spouses, which can 
be proxied by relative income or the receipt of bequests.  
 
Nevertheless, previous studies on the relationship between marriage and wealth are 
predominantly based on household wealth. The only exception is Lersch (2017), who 
examines the relationship between marriage and wealth using both household and 
 
6 Note that, in the field of family research, these theoretical concepts are commonly referred to as relative 
and absolute resources. According to the relative resource theory originally formulated by Blood and Wolfe 
(1960), the balance of power within married couples depends on the relative resources that each spouse 
brings to the household. On the other hand, some studies show that married women have a substantial 
degree of economic autonomy in domestic lives by showing that their absolute resources matter more than 
their relative resources (e.g., Gupta, 2007). 
7 See, for example, Chiappori and Molina (2020) for a survey of the empirical literature. 
9 
 
personal wealth in Germany. He finds that both men and women experience substantial 
wealth premiums of marriage not only in household wealth but also in personal wealth. 
For women, marriage is found to be wealth-enhancing largely through the couple’s joint 
investment in housing while such an effect of marriage is not observed in the case of 
nonhousing wealth. By contrast, in the case of men, marriage seems to be beneficial for 
personal wealth accumulation in types of assets other than housing.  
 
This paper tries to assess whether the finding of the presence of marriage wealth 
premiums in both household and personal wealth obtained for Germany also holds in the 
case of Japan where resource pooling in legal terms is hindered by institutional factors, 
as described in the previous section. 
 
3.3 Marriage Wealth Premiums Over Time 
 
Another limitation of previous studies is that while they generally find a positive effect 
of marriage on wealth, they predominantly examine the instantaneous effect of marriage 
on wealth. While there are some studies that look at the effect of the duration of marriage 
on wealth, the estimation strategy in such studies assumes a linear relationship between 
marriage and wealth (e.g., French, Painter, and Vespa, 2017; Ulker, 2009; Zagorsky, 2005). 
For instance, Zagorsky (2005) finds married respondents’ wealth to increase by about 
16% per year. Ulker (2009) also finds that the length of the longest marriage is positively 
associated with current household wealth. 
 
It is, however, not clear whether it is appropriate to assume a linear relationship between 
marriage and wealth as married couples are likely to go through a number of important 
changes during the course of their marriage. This paper therefore tries to go beyond the 
existing literature by examining how the relationship between marriage and wealth 
evolves over the course of the marriage and whether this over-time relationship differs 
between financial and nonfinancial wealth and between household and personal wealth.  
 




The data used for the empirical analysis come from the Japanese Panel Survey of 
Consumers (JPSC), which has been conducted annually in Japan since 1993 by the 
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Institute for Research on Household Economics and since 2017 by the Panel Data 
Research Center at Keio University. One of the unique features of this survey is that it 
focuses on young women, both unmarried and married, and traces the same individuals 
on a yearly basis. The initial sample at the start of the survey in 1993 comprised 1,500 
women aged 24-34. Subsequently, 500 women aged 24-27 in 1997, 836 women aged 24-
29 in 2003, 636 women aged 24-28 in 2008, and 648 women aged 24-28 in 2013 were 
added to the sample. The sample was drawn each time to be nationally representative 
using two-stage stratified random sampling. The relatively high response rate (e.g., about 
96% in the case of the latest (25th) wave) helps maintain the representativeness of the 
sample for the age group in question. Table A1 in Appendix compares the JPSC data with 
those from other nationally representative surveys conducted by the Government of Japan. 
While an exact comparison is not possible, the figures in Table A1 show that the JPSC 
data are broadly consistent with those from other surveys.  
 
For the present analysis, I use mainly data from the 11th to the 25th waves of the survey, 
which were conducted during the 2003-2017 period because earlier waves do not collect 
all of the information required for the present analysis. Note that the data used for the 
present analysis are unbalanced panel data. The estimation sample comprises 2,923 
respondents with 19,541 individual-year observations after removing observations with 
missing information. Table A2 in Appendix shows that the estimation sample remains 
largely consistent with the original sample in terms of key variables.  
 
4.2 Estimation Methods 
 
To investigate the relationship between marriage and wealth, I estimate the following 
fixed-effects regression model: 
 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (1) 
 
where wit is the wealth level of respondent i in year t, Mit contains variables that capture 
the respondent’s marital status, Xit contains variables pertaining to the time-variant 
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent, υi captures individual time-invariant 
unobservables, and ɛit is an error term.  
 
The fixed-effects regression model essentially focuses on variations over time for the 
same person. Hence, if I include in the estimation model a dummy variable for being 
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married, the coefficient on this variable captures the effect of a transition into marriage 
on wealth holdings. However, the wealth effect of marriage may change over time. To 
examine the short-term and long-term effects of marriage, the present analysis also looks 
at the relationship between marriage and wealth for each year after marriage by including 
in the estimation model a set of dummy variables that denote the number of years since 
the respondent’s marriage, as explained in detail below. 
 
One of the issues that could arise when estimating the relationship between marriage and 
wealth is the non-random sorting of individuals into marriage. Estimating a fixed-effects 
regression model eliminates selection bias due to time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics, though the estimates are still potentially subject to bias due to time-variant 
unobservable characteristics. Unfortunately, there are no appropriate instruments that can 
be used for the set of marriage duration dummies included in the empirical model. This 
therefore limits the analysis to at best identifying associations between marriage and 
wealth, and I cannot infer causality from the present analysis. Nevertheless, the present 
analysis still performs the important task of opening up the black box of how married and 
unmarried women accumulate wealth over time, which has direct implications for their 




As indicated in equation (1), the dependent variable in this analysis is the level of wealth. 
I use wealth information at both the household and personal levels to examine whether 
the wealth effect of marriage differs depending on which measure of wealth I use. I also 
use both financial and nonfinancial wealth as dependent variables in addition to using 
total wealth to see whether the relationship between marriage and wealth differs 
depending on the type of wealth. Note that all the wealth variables employed in the 
empirical analysis are expressed as net worth by subtracting the value of loans from the 
value of wealth. 
 
In the survey, unmarried respondents are asked to indicate the total value of saving and 
that of securities held in their own name. The former includes various types of saving 
accounts in post offices, banks, and shinkin banks (credit unions), payroll saving, gold 
investment/saving accounts, and medium-term government security funds while the latter 
includes bonds, stocks, investment trusts, and loan and money trusts evaluated at market 
prices. In the case of married respondents, they are asked to indicate the total value of 
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saving and that of securities held by their households as a whole8 as well as those held 
in respondents’ own name. The survey also collects information on the total value of 
saving-type insurance in which the respondent or, in case she is married, her husband is 
enrolled. Financial wealth is thus calculated by adding the total values of saving, 
securities, and insurance. 
 
As for nonfinancial wealth, it is defined as the market value of respondents’ primary 
residence (house/condominium including land, if applicable). Respondents are asked to 
indicate the market value and ownership of their primary residence and land (if 
applicable) if they live in a house/condominium owned by themselves or by their family 
members. Unfortunately, in the case of joint ownership, the data do not provide each 
family member’s exact ownership share of the property and land. I therefore assume the 
equal sharing of nonfinancial wealth among family members who jointly own the 
property and land.  
 
Financial and nonfinancial net worth are then calculated by subtracting the total value of 
nonhousing and housing loans from the total value of financial and nonfinancial wealth, 
respectively, and total net worth is calculated as the sum of financial and nonfinancial net 
worth. Note that the survey does not collect information on loans at the personal level in 
the case of married respondents. I therefore assume that the respondent is responsible for 
the same shares of nonhousing and housing loans as her shares of financial and 
nonfinancial wealth owned by the married couple, respectively. 
 
Note that, due to the unavailability of data, the wealth variables in this analysis do not 
include the value of second homes, pension wealth, motor vehicles, and consumer 
durables. Since men tend to own more of such assets, the wealth accumulation gap 
between married and unmarried women in the present analysis is likely to be a lower 
bound of the true gap. 
 
In sum, for the unmarried sample, I construct three dependent variables—namely, 
personal net worth for total, financial, and nonfinancial wealth. As for the married sample, 
I construct six dependent variables—namely, household and personal net worth for total, 
financial, and nonfinancial wealth. In the case of household net worth, household wealth 
 
8 Only financial assets held by the respondent, her husband, and their children are included. Unfortunately, 
I cannot separate the financial wealth held in the children’s names from the financial wealth held in the 
respondent’s or her husband’s name. Nevertheless, the share of financial wealth held in the children’s names 
is presumably relatively small. 
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is assumed to be shared equally between the respondent and her husband. To account for 
the fact that consumption needs are related to household size, I express household net 
worth as equivalized household net worth by summing the respondent’s own personal net 
worth and that of her husband and dividing the total value by the square root of two (i.e., 
the respondent and her husband). I do not use total household size to make this adjustment 
but control for the number of children in the regression analysis instead.9 
 
Finally, to correct for the skewness of the wealth distribution, the value of the wealth-
related variables is transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) function, which 





The main explanatory variables of interest in the present analysis are the respondent’s 
marital status variables. In the fixed-effects regression models, the coefficient on a simple 
marriage dummy variable would capture only the short-term relationship between 
marriage and wealth. In order to investigate the longer-term relationship and how it 
evolves over time, I also include a set of marriage duration dummy variables. More 
specifically, I include a variable that equals one if the respondent marries and is in the 
transition year, a dummy variable that equals one if she is married and is in the year after 
the transition year, a dummy variable that equals one if she is married and is in the second 
year after the transition year, and so forth, up to 30 years after the transition year. For 
longer marriage durations, I include a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent 
is married and is in the 31st year or later after the transition year. In addition to this set of 
variables, I include a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is divorced. Given 
that the sample comprises relatively young women, I have too few observations on 
widows to have a separate dummy variable for them. I therefore exclude respondents who 
are widowed from the estimation sample. 
 
Note that the JPSC does not collect information on cohabitation. However, cohabitation 
remains relatively rare in the case of Japan. According to data from the 15th Japanese 
National Fertility Survey conducted in 2015, 10  the proportion of people who were 
 
9 Note that the regression analysis was also conducted using as the dependent variable a measure of 
equivalized household net worth that also takes into account the number of children, but the results were 
similar to those reported in this paper. These regression results are available from the author upon request. 
10 Available at http://www.ipss.go.jp/ps-doukou/j/doukou15/doukou15_gaiyo.asp 
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cohabiting at the time of the survey was only 1.8% (1.7%) among never married women 
(men) aged 18-34.  
 
As for other explanatory variables, I include in the estimation model the number of 
children as well as a variable for residing with parents/parents-in-law. The latter variable 
equals one only if the respondent resides with her parents/parents-in-law and shares living 
expenses with them. I also control for income: in the case of unmarried respondents, I use 
their personal income, and for married respondents, I use the sum of their personal income 
and that of their husbands and adjust it for economies of scale in consumption by dividing 
it by the square root of two, as I do for the wealth variables. In addition, I include in the 
estimation model the total amount of bequests and/or inter vivos transfers received from 
the respondent’s parents/parents-in-law during the past year. I use the IHS transformation 
of these income and intergenerational transfer variables, as I do for the wealth variables. 
All of the wealth, income, and intergenerational transfer variables are expressed in 2017 
prices. 
 
How wealth is distributed within married couples may depend on how the household 
budget is managed on a daily basis within the household. In the JPSC, respondents are 
asked which type (out of 18 different types) best describes the way in which the monthly 
household budget is managed in their households. Based on responses to this question, I 
sort respondents into 5 different categories: (i) the respondent receives her husband’s 
entire income or the respondent is unmarried; (ii) the respondent receives part of her 
husband’s income but she does not share her own income; (iii) the respondent receives 
part of her husband’s income and she also shares her own income or does not have her 
own income; (iv) the respondent and her husband manage their respective income 
separately; and (v) the respondent gives her entire income to her husband.  
 
Finally, I control for the key characteristics of the respondent, including her age, age 
squared, and employment status. I also include year dummies, regional dummies, and a 
dummy variable for residing in a major city. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables. About 
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37% of the sample is unmarried.  
 
The average level of personal total net worth for the full sample is about 3.1 million yen 
(about US$ 28,200), whereas the average figure for the never married sample (4.2 million 
yen) is found to be significantly greater than that for the married sample (2.5 million yen) 
(see Figure 1). These figures suggest that married women are not necessarily wealthier 
than never married women if wealth is measured as personal wealth. However, if wealth 
is measured in terms of household wealth for the married sample (i.e., equivalized 
household net worth) on the assumption that household resources are shared equally 
within married couples, married women are found to have a higher level of wealth (7.5 
million yen) than their never married or divorced counterparts.  
 
To take a closer look at differences in wealth accumulation patterns between married and 
never married women, Figure 2 shows the average level of personal total net worth over 
the life cycle of married and never married women. For married women, it also shows the 
average level of equivalized household total net worth. As far as personal total net worth 
is concerned, Figure 2 clearly shows that never married women accumulate wealth much 
faster than married women. However, if we assume that household wealth is shared 
equally within married couples and use equivalized household total net worth for the 
married sample instead, the wealth accumulation patterns of married and never married 
women are found to be similar up to the age of about 50, but they start diverging 
thereafter: never married women’s wealth starts stagnating while that of married women 
continues to increase. Figure 2 therefore seems to suggest that the wealth premium of 
marriage is relatively limited in Japan and that it is observed only at a later stage of the 
life cycle and also only under the assumption that household wealth is shared equally 
within married couples. 
 
Do married couples share their wealth equally, as is commonly assumed? Table 2 shows 
that married women own, on average, only about 22% of household total wealth (gross 
wealth) in the case of Japan. Moreover, among married couples who own their primary 
residence (and land, if applicable), married women own, on average, only about 16% of 
their primary residence. Note that only about 29% of married women own part or all of 
their primary residence among married couples who own their primary residence. Table 
2 also suggests that the share of married women’s wealth in total household wealth is 




Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
     
Personal total net worth (IHS-transformed) 1.00 1.30 -4.74 5.79 
  Untransformed value (million yen) 3.05 7.15 -57.24 164.32 
Personal financial net worth (IHS-transformed) 0.97 1.15 -3.94 5.79 
  Untransformed value (million yen) 2.60 5.79 -25.73 164.32 
Personal nonfinancial net worth (IHS-transformed) 0.11 0.78 -4.74 5.59 
  Untransformed value (million yen) 0.45 3.58 -57.24 133.59 
     
Equivalized household total net worth (IHS-transformed)* 1.56 1.93 -4.35 6.12 
  Untransformed value (million yen)* 7.53 14.73 -38.79 226.88 
Equivalized household financial net worth (IHS-transformed)* 1.63 1.39 -4.31 5.31 
  Untransformed value (million yen)* 5.51 8.88 -37.17 101.32 
Equivalized household nonfinancial net worth (IHS-transformed)* 0.39 1.70 -4.39 5.85 
  Untransformed value (million yen)* 2.02 9.14 -40.47 173.30 
     
Marital status     
   Never married 0.29  0 1 
   Married 0.63  0 1 
   Divorced 0.08  0 1 
Number of children 1.23 1.16 0 7 
Co-resides with parents/parents-in-law 0.29  0 1 
     
Equivalized annual income (IHS-transformed) 1.93 0.60 0 4.61 
  Untransformed value (million yen) 3.97 2.40 0 50.35 
Intergenerational transfers (IHS-transformed) 0.04 0.32 0 5.19 
  Untransformed value (million yen) 0.14 1.78 0 90.18 
     
Budget management     
  Respondent controls 0.79  0 1 
  Respondent does not share but husband shares 0.03  0 1 
  Respondent shares and husband shares 0.15  0 1 
  Separate management 0.03  0 1 
  Husband controls 0.01  0 1 
     
Respondents’ characteristics     
Age 37.52 7.96 24 58 
Age squared/100 14.71 6.25 5.76 33.64 
Employment status     
    Regular worker 0.31  0 1 
    Irregular worker 0.35  0 1 
    Self-employed 0.06  0 1 
    Not in labor force 0.28  0 1 
     
Resides in a major city 0.29  0 1 
     
No. of observations 19,541 
No. of individuals 2,923 
S.D. = standard deviation, Min. = minimum value, Max. = maximum value 
* Figures for equivalized household net worth are based on the married sample only. 





Figure 1. The Average Level of Total Net Worth by Marital Status (Million Yen) 
 
Note: Spikes indicate the 95% confidence interval. 
Source: Calculations based on data from the JPSC. 
 
Figure 2. The Average Level of Personal/Equivalized Household Wealth 
(Total Net Worth) by Age Group (Million Yen) 
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Table 2. Wives’ Share of Household Income and Wealth 
 Mean Standard deviation 
   
All respondents   
Income 0.18 0.19 
Total wealth 0.22 0.26 
Financial wealth 0.25 0.26 
Nonfinancial wealth 0.16 0.28 
   
Respondents who are employed   
Income 0.26 0.18 
Total wealth 0.24 0.27 
Financial wealth 0.28 0.27 
Nonfinancial wealth 0.18 0.29 
   
Respondents who have regular employment   
Income 0.41 0.15 
Total wealth 0.35 0.27 
Financial wealth 0.37 0.28 
Nonfinancial wealth 0.30 0.31 
   
Note: The figures in the table are based on married respondents for whom positive amounts are recorded 
for household total income, total wealth, financial wealth, and nonfinancial wealth. 
Source: Calculations based on data from the JPSC. 
 
The relatively small proportion of married women who own all or part of their primary 
residence in Japan is in sharp contrast to what Lersch (2017) finds for Germany. Lersch 
(2017) shows that, in the case of Germany, married women are able to accumulate more 
wealth than their never married counterparts mainly through joint investment in housing 
with their husbands. Sierminska, Frick, and Grabka (2010) also find for Germany that 
housing wealth tends to be shared more than nonhousing wealth within married couples.  
 
5.2 Regression Results 
 
To examine the relationship between marriage and wealth, I conduct a regression analysis, 
as explained in Section 4.2. Table 3 shows the estimation results for the fixed-effects 





Table 3: Estimation Results for Determinants of Wealth (Fixed-effects Models) 

















 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
             
Marital status             
  (never married)             
Duration dummies See Figures 3-5 
Divorced -0.313*** 0.109 -0.297*** 0.098 -0.004 0.064 -0.007 0.160 -0.030 0.119 0.112 0.142 
Number of children -0.042 0.026 -0.048** 0.020 0.005 0.022 -0.042 0.035 -0.041* 0.022 0.041 0.034 
Co-resides with 
parents/parents-in-law 
0.070* 0.037 0.064** 0.032 0.014 0.026 0.072 0.047 0.055 0.034 0.040 0.042 
             
Equivalized annual 
income 
0.117*** 0.026 0.129*** 0.025 -0.011 0.015 0.160*** 0.034 0.166*** 0.028 0.001 0.028 
Intergenerational 
transfers 
0.078*** 0.022 0.030* 0.017 0.064*** 0.023 0.112*** 0.023 0.019 0.023 0.127*** 0.032 
             
Budget management             
  (Respondent 
controls) 
            
  Respondent does not 
share but husband 
shares 
0.126** 0.052 0.106** 0.042 0.018 0.042 0.120* 0.069 0.140*** 0.049 0.006 0.065 
  Respondent shares 
and husband shares 
0.054 0.033 0.053** 0.025 -0.001 0.026 0.082* 0.047 0.095*** 0.030 -0.014 0.045 
  Separate 
management 
0.045 0.067 0.099* 0.058 -0.044 0.044 -0.093 0.106 0.067 0.071 -0.203** 0.089 
  Husband controls 0.011 0.080 -0.024 0.066 0.053 0.058 -0.125 0.107 0.034 0.073 -0.148 0.094 
             
Age 0.117*** 0.019 0.134*** 0.017 -0.021* 0.012 0.133*** 0.023 0.155*** 0.018 -0.035* 0.020 
Age squared/100 -0.094*** 0.024 -0.121*** 0.022 0.039** 0.017 -0.113*** 0.031 -0.146*** 0.024 0.060** 0.028 
Employment status             
  (Not in labor force)             
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 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
  Regular worker 0.017 0.036 0.023 0.030 -0.018 0.025 -0.066 0.045 -0.065* 0.033 -0.042 0.042 
  Irregular worker -0.045* 0.025 -0.039* 0.020 -0.006 0.018 -0.107*** 0.036 -0.084*** 0.025 -0.025 0.037 
  Self-employed 0.064 0.064 0.030 0.045 0.051 0.048 -0.049 0.093 -0.121 0.064 0.078 0.091 
             
Resides in a major city 0.024 0.050 0.022 0.042 0.024 0.043 -0.045 0.081 -0.004 0.052 -0.087 0.081 
Constant -1.489*** 0.424 -1.777*** 0.386 0.304 0.224 -1.665*** 0.484 -2.158*** 0.416 0.608 0.376 
R2 0.142 0.171 0.012 0.118 0.170 0.044 
No. of observations 19,541 19, 541 19, 541 19, 541 19, 541 19, 541 
No. of individuals 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 
Coef. = coefficient, S.E. = standard error 
Note: The results in the first three columns of the table are based on regression analyses in which personal wealth is used for both the married and unmarried samples. 
The results in the last three columns of the table are based on regression analyses in which personal wealth is used for the unmarried sample while equivalized 
household wealth is used for the married sample. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Regional and year dummies 
are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
Source: Estimation based on data from the JPSC.
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Figure 3. Estimated Coefficients on Marriage Duration Dummies 
(Total Net Worth) 
 
Note: The dotted line noted as “personal” shows the estimated coefficients on marriage duration dummies 
from the regression analysis in which personal wealth is used for both the married and unmarried samples. 
The solid line noted as “personal/equivalized household” shows the estimated coefficients on marriage 
duration dummies from the regression analysis in which personal wealth is used for the unmarried sample 
while equivalized household wealth is used for the married sample. The rest of the regression results are 
reported in Table 3. Only the coefficients in black (i.e., not those in grey) are statistically significant at least 
at the 10% level. 
Source: Estimation based on data from the JPSC. 
 
In order to investigate the longer-term relationship between marriage and wealth and how 
it evolves over time, I include in the estimation model a set of marriage duration dummies, 
instead of including a dummy variable for being married, as explained in Section 4.2. The 
coefficients on these marriage duration dummies are reported in Figures 3-5. They 
indicate how the wealth premium of marriage changes as the duration of marriage 
becomes longer. Note that the base category for these marriage duration dummies is never 
married. The solid lines show the coefficients obtained from the regression analyses in 
which personal wealth is used as married women’s wealth holding measure whereas the 
dotted lines show those obtained from the regression analyses in which household wealth 
is used instead. Note that only the estimated coefficients that are shown in black (i.e., not 















Figure 4. Estimated Coefficients on Marriage Duration Dummies  
(Financial Net Worth) 
 
Note: The dotted line noted as “personal” shows the estimated coefficients on marriage duration dummies 
from the regression analysis in which personal wealth is used for both the married and unmarried samples. 
The solid line noted as “personal/equivalized household” shows the estimated coefficients on marriage 
duration dummies from the regression analysis in which personal wealth is used for the unmarried sample 
while equivalized household wealth is used for the married sample. The rest of the regression results are 
reported in Table 3. Only the coefficients in black (i.e., not those in grey) are statistically significant at least 
at the 10% level. 
Source: Estimation based on data from the JPSC. 
 
If personal wealth is used as the measure of wealth, marriage is found to be negatively 
and significantly associated with total net worth throughout the duration of the marriage 
(see Figure 3). A similar relationship is observed between marriage and financial net 
worth (see Figure 4). Figures 3 and 4 also show that the relationship between marriage 
and wealth is not linear, unlike what is often assumed in the previous literature, suggesting 
the importance of allowing the effect of marriage to be non-linear. As for the relationship 
between marriage and nonfinancial net worth, it is found to be hardly significant 
statistically (see Figure 5). This is not surprising given that a relatively small number of 

















Figure 5. Estimated Coefficients on Marriage Duration Dummies  
(Nonfinancial Net Worth) 
 
Note: The dotted line noted as “personal” shows the estimated coefficients on marriage duration dummies 
from the regression analysis in which personal wealth is used for both the married and unmarried samples. 
The solid line noted as “personal/equivalized household” shows the estimated coefficients on marriage 
duration dummies from the regression analysis in which personal wealth is used for the unmarried sample 
while equivalized household wealth is used for the married sample. The rest of the regression results are 
reported in Table 3. Only the coefficients in black (i.e., not those in grey) are statistically significant at least 
at the 10% level. 
Source: Estimation based on data from the JPSC. 
 
These results are in sharp contrast to what Lersch (2017) finds for Germany where 
substantial wealth premiums of marriage are found for women not only in household 
wealth but also in personal wealth, mainly through joint investment in housing with their 
husbands. Institutional barriers that prevent married couples from having joint ownership 
of their residence in cases in which wives do not have sufficient income or wealth may 
explain the absence of marriage wealth premiums in the case of personal wealth in Japan. 
 
Moreover, in the case of Japan, a relatively large share of women still faces disruptions 
in their careers due to childbearing and childrearing. Even if they remain or return to the 
labor market, they tend to reduce their working hours. Only about 19% of the married 
sample is engaged in regular employment as opposed to 52% for the unmarried sample. 
Table 3 shows that, among the employment-related variables, only the coefficients on 
irregular employment are statistically significant. The fact that they are negative suggests 













Table 4: Estimated Coefficients on Respondents’ and Their Husbands’ Income and 
Intergenerational Transfers from Respondents’ Parents/Parents-in-law 




 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
       
Respondent’s own 














-0.010 0.023 -0.022 0.019 0.016 0.024 
       
No. of observations 19,541 19,541 19,541 
No. of individuals 2,923 2,923 2,923 
Coef. = coefficient, S.E. = standard error 
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The rest of 
the explanatory variables included in Table 3 as well as year and regional dummies are included in all 
regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. 
Source: Estimation based on data from the JPSC. 
 
To investigate the implications of women’s employment for their wealth accumulation in 
more detail, a regression is run separating the income variable into two variables – one 
for the respondent’s own income and the other for her husband’s income. Similarly, I 
separate the intergenerational transfer variable into two variables – one for transfers from 
the respondent’s own parents and the other for transfers from her parents-in-law. The 
relevant regression results are shown in Table 4.11 
 
Table 4 clearly indicates that personal financial net worth, and hence total net worth, is 
accumulated mainly through the respondent’s own income as well as through transfers 
from her own parents, while personal nonfinancial net worth is accumulated mainly 
through transfers from her own parents. By contrast, the income of the respondent’s 
husband or transfers from her parents-in-law hardly have any bearing on her personal 
wealth, which seems to challenge the commonly made assumption of the equal sharing 
of wealth within married couples.  
 
 
11 The rest of the regression results remain similar to those reported in Table 3. The full regression results 
are available from the author upon request. 
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Nevertheless, married women potentially have access to all or part of the wealth owned 
by their husbands. If we assume that household wealth is shared informally within 
married couples, it might be more appropriate to use household wealth as married 
women’s wealth holding measure.  
 
When equivalized household wealth is used as the dependent variable for the married 
sample, marriage is found to be positively and significantly associated with nonfinancial 
net worth but only when respondents have been married for 11 years or longer, and the 
effect becomes larger with the duration of the marriage (see Figure 5). The positive 
relationship between marriage and nonfinancial wealth is due partly to the fact that 
Japanese people tend to purchase their primary residence after they marry. Moreover, 
given that the wealth variables in this analysis are expressed as net worth, it is possible 
that the positive relationship between marriage and nonfinancial wealth is observed only 
after people pay off a certain amount of their housing loans. 
 
As for total and financial net worth, their relationship with marriage is hardly significant 
statistically (see Figures 3 and 4). This is rather surprising given that previous studies 
predominantly show a positive relationship between marriage and wealth, as discussed in 
Section 3. The limited positive effect of marriage in the case of Japan even when 
household wealth is used as married women’s wealth holding measure may be explained 
by the fact that married women tend to withdraw from the labor market or reduce their 
labor supply in order to meet their family responsibilities. Hence, even if married couples 
share equally the wealth accumulated through husbands’ income, married women may 
not necessarily be able to accumulate more wealth than their unmarried counterparts.  
 
On the other hand, these results also imply that married women can accumulate as much 
wealth as unmarried women even if they earn less income, allowing them to enjoy a level 
of economic wellbeing no lower than that of their unmarried counterparts despite their 
limited labor supply. Furthermore, there are some signs in the empirical results that the 
wealth premium of marriage is realized when the duration of marriage becomes longer, 
particularly as married couples pay off their housing loans. Given that the sample used 
for the empirical analysis in this paper is relatively young, it would be interesting to 
reexamine how the relationship between marriage and wealth evolves over longer 
durations when the necessary data become available. 
 
The rest of the regression results are broadly similar regardless of whether I use 
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equivalized household or personal net worth for the married sample (see Table 3). The 
number of children is negatively and significantly associated with financial net worth, 
which suggests that the cost of raising children outweighs the positive effect of having 
children on financial wealth such as creating an incentive to accumulate wealth in order 
to leave a bequest. Household income is positively and significantly associated with total 
and financial net worth, as expected. As for the receipt of intergenerational transfers, its 
positive relationship with total net worth seems driven mainly through its effect on 
nonfinancial net worth. On the other hand, co-residing with parents/parents-in-law seems 
to help women accumulate personal total and financial wealth. 
 
Turning finally to the implications of household budget management type for wealth 
accumulation, it is interesting to find that women in households in which the husband 
shares his income with his wife have higher personal and household wealth than women 




This paper examined the relationship between marriage and wealth over time in the case 
of Japan using the JPSC data. By exploiting the availability of data on personal wealth, it 
also investigated whether the effect of marriage on wealth differs depending on whether 
wealth is measured in terms of household or personal wealth. 
 
When equivalized household net worth is used as married women’s wealth holding 
measure on the assumption that household resources are shared equally within married 
couples, marriage is found to contribute to women’s wealth holdings but only to their 
nonfinancial net worth though there are some signs that it also contributes to their total 
net worth as the duration of marriage becomes longer. On the other hand, if wealth is 
measured in terms of personal net worth, marriage is found to be negatively and 
significantly associated with women’s wealth holdings, more specifically with their total 
and financial net worth.    
 
The observed negative effect of marriage on personal wealth in the case of Japan is in 
sharp contrast to the positive effect found for Germany where married women are found 
to be able to accumulate their personal wealth largely through joint investment in housing 
with their husbands (Lersch, 2017). The joint ownership of housing seems to be less 
common in Japan and only a relatively small proportion of married women own housing 
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wealth. This may be due partly to the fact that married women in Japan are more likely 
than those in other developed countries to leave the labor market or to reduce their 
working hours for childbearing and childrearing, as a result of which their lifetime income 
is likely to be lower. Moreover, this cannot be compensated for by wealth transfers from 
husbands for the purposes of joint investment in housing because wealth transfers 
between spouses are subject to gift taxes in Japan.  
 
These results cast doubt on the commonly made assumption that household wealth is 
shared equally within married couples. At least in the case of Japan, the actual allocation 
of intrahousehold resources seems more in line with the collective model rather than the 
unitary model. This, in turn, suggests that Japanese women have an undesired economic 
dependency on their husbands and that their bargaining power within married couples is 
relatively weak. 
 
Finally, the empirical results obtained in the present analysis underscore the importance 
of looking at the relationship between marriage and wealth over time as the relationship 
is found to differ with marriage duration. 
 
The empirical analysis conducted in this paper is, however, not without caveats. While 
estimating fixed-effects regression models helps eliminate selection bias due to time-
invariant unobservable characteristics, the estimates are still potentially subject to 
possible bias due to time-variant unobservable characteristics. The difficulty of 
identifying appropriate time-variant instruments did not allow me to fully address this 
issue, and it is left as an important agenda for future research. In addition, the relatively 
young sample prevented me from examining the wealth premium of marriage over a 
longer horizon. Furthermore, while the JPSC provides unique data on personal wealth, 
they have important limitations, such as the absence of information on each family 
member’s exact ownership share of nonfinancial wealth when nonfinancial wealth is 
owned jointly among family members. Some assumptions therefore had to be made to 
calculate respondents’ personal wealth. This is likely to have caused some noise to the 
empirical analysis and we certainly need to interpret the results with caution. 
 
Nevertheless, the findings of this paper have some important policy implications. The 
results suggest that promoting gender equality in the labor market will help women 
enhance their economic wellbeing and accumulate sufficient wealth for old age regardless 
of their marital status. It is equally important to create an environment where married 
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women can continue working even after getting married or bearing a child so that they 
will not have to rely so heavily on their husbands for their economic wellbeing. Finally, 
removing institutional barriers such as the imposition of gift taxes on wealth transfers 
between spouses will help enhance the equal sharing of household wealth within married 







Table A1. Comparison with Other Nationally Representative Surveys (2015) 
 JPSC 
 (2015 wave) 
Comparison Data source 
    
Women’s marital status (%)    
  Married (aged 25-29) 37.3 36.3 2015 Population Census 
  Married (aged 30-39) 65.5 65.7 2015 Population Census 
  Married (aged 40-49) 74.2 72.2 2015 Population Census 
Women’s employment status (%)    
  Employed (aged 25-34) 76.1 72.1 2015 Labor Force Survey 
  Employed (aged 35-44) 74.7 71.2 2015 Labor Force Survey 
  Employed (aged 45-54) 78.2 74.8 2015 Labor Force Survey 
Homeownership (%)    
 Married    
    Husband aged 25-34 37.5 36.0 2015 Population Census 
    Husband aged 35-44 63.5 65.8 2015 Population Census 
    Husband aged 45-54 79.1 76.9 2015 Population Census 
  Unmarried    
    Aged 25-34 5.2 4.7 2015 Population Census 
    Aged 35-44 14.9 14.9 2015 Population Census 
    Aged 35-54 41.2 33.7 2015 Population Census 
Household income (million yen)    
  Married    
    Husband aged 25-29 5.3 5.0 2015 Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey (FIES) 
    Husband aged 30-34 6.1 5.8 2015 FIES 
    Husband aged 35-39 7.0 6.6 2015 FIES 
    Husband aged 40-44 6.9 7.2 2015 FIES 
    Husband aged 45-49 8.1 8.0 2015 FIES 
    Husband aged 50-54 8.5 8.5 2015 FIES 
  Unmarried (employed)    
    Aged less than 35 3.3 3.4 2015 FIES 
    Aged 35-59 3.6 3.8 2015 FIES 
Financial assets (million yen)    
  Married    
    Husband aged 25-29 2.9 2.7 2015 FIES 
    Husband aged 30-34 4.2 5.3 2015 FIES 
    Husband aged 35-39 6.4 7.7 2015 FIES 
    Husband aged 40-44 6.7 9.2 2015 FIES 
    Husband aged 45-49 11.1 11.3 2015 FIES 
    Husband aged 50-54 11.5 15.7 2015 FIES 
Note: In the case of homeownership rates and levels of household income and financial assets, the figures 
for married are based on married couples who live by themselves (with or without children) and those for 
unmarried are based on unmarried women who live by themselves. Note that the FIES data do not contain 
information on the financial assets of single-person households. 
Source: Calculations based on data from the JPSC (based on respondents who reported a value for the 
respective variable), the 2015 Population Census (https://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2015/kekka.html), the 
2015 Labor Force Survey (https://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/index2.html#kekka), and the 2015 Family 





Table A2. Comparison of the Estimation Sample with the Original Sample 
 (a) Original sample (b) Estimation sample 
   
Respondent’s characteristics   
  Age (years) 35.7 37.5 
  Married (%) 68.3 62.9 
  Employed (%) 72.1 72.4 
    
Wealth   
Homeownership (%) 52.2 47.9 
Personal total net worth (million yen) 3.0 3.0 
Household total net worth (million yen) 7.9 8.2 
   
No. of observations 46,258 19,541 
Note: The homeownership rate is based on respondents who do not reside with their parents/parents-in-law. 
The figures in column (a) are based on the original sample (based on respondents who reported a value for 
the respective variable). The figures in column (b) are based on the estimation sample that remains after 
removing those who are widowed and those with missing information for any of the variables included in 
the estimation model. 
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